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Abstract 
We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate 
goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The 
LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of 
available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase 
in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a 
rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger 
than the static costs. 
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1 Introduction 
Developing countries are largely dependent on R&D efforts undertaken in the high income 
countries for access to newly developed goods and services and the availability of quality 
improvements for existing goods and services, see e.g. Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997). A 
few years earlier, Romer (1994) already incorporated this fact in a static model, where he argued 
that the costs of unexpected increases in trade restrictions are smaller than the costs of expected 
increases in trade restrictions, because the latter affect the range of goods available in the 
economy. In essence, if some new goods or quality improvements are not imported because of the 
high trade restrictions, this deprives consumers from the market surplus created by new goods and 
producers from the efficiency gains associated with new intermediate goods or better ways to 
organize the production process, leading to large welfare losses. Romer (1994) discusses these 
welfare losses, which he refers to as “Dupuit triangles” (named after a 19th century French 
engineer) to distinguish them from the Harberger triangles normally used to estimate welfare 
costs of trade restrictions. 
We provide a dynamic extension of Romer (1994) in an endogenous growth setting, see 
Romer (1986, 1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992).1 Using the 
variety approach, we analyze a small developing economy (LDC) which does not affect the 
equilibrium in the Rest of the World (RoW). All R&D is undertaken in RoW, which leads to the 
steady invention and introduction of new varieties of intermediate goods in RoW (with positive 
production externalities). As in Romer (1990), the providers of intermediate goods have market 
power and are able to charge a mark-up over marginal costs. As in Romer (1994), there is a fixed 
(set-up) cost that must be incurred before a newly invented variety can be introduced on the LDC 
market. Since these set-up costs differ between the varieties, inventors of new varieties will only 
incur these extra costs if they think it is worthwhile to do so, that is if the (expected) discounted 
                                                 
1 Van Marrewijk (1999) provides an overview of endogenous growth. 
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operating profits for the LDC market are larger than the set-up costs for their particular variety. 
At any point in time, therefore, not all varieties available in RoW will also be available on the 
LDC market. Deriving balanced growth paths and explicit transition dynamics, the key questions 
we address are: (i) what determines which intermediate goods are actually introduced on the LDC 
market and (ii) what are the static and dynamic welfare consequences of trade restrictions.  
Two implications of our model are worth emphasizing from the start. First, the estimated 
static costs of trade restrictions for the LDC are smaller than the dynamic costs of trade 
restrictions if, and only if, the increase in trade restrictions reduces the share of invented 
intermediate goods introduced on the market. In this dynamic setting it is therefore not the fact 
that we ignore the Dupuit triangles of newly invented goods in estimating the effects of an 
increase in trade restrictions, but the fact that an increase in trade restrictions affects the share of 
goods introduced on the LDC market. Second, as a result of the sunk-cost nature of the set-up 
costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path of the LDC economy after a change in trade 
restrictions. An increase in the level of trade restrictions will slow-down economic growth and 
put the economy on a transition path to a new balanced growth rate. If the new level of trade 
restrictions exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and stagnation occurs. If 
trade restrictions fall, on the other hand, the LDC economy may embark on a rapid catch-up 
process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of previously-invented-but-not-yet-
introduced intermediate goods which may now, as a result of increased profitability, be 
introduced on the LDC market. Section 6 discusses some empirical evidence supporting this 
asymmetric adjustment path. 
After providing the structure of our model (section 2), we analyze the fraction of intermediate 
goods introduced on the LDC market (section 3) and balanced growth paths (section 4). We then 
analyze policy changes and (asymmetric) adjustment dynamics (section 5), followed by a general 
discussion (section 6) and some conclusions (section 7). 
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2 The model 
Our analysis focuses on a small developing economy (LDC) which at time t  uses labor )(tL  and 
a range (indexed by i ) of different types of intermediate goods ),( tix  to produce a final good 
)(tY , see (1). The set of available intermediate goods at time t  is denoted by )(tA . We use the 
term intermediate goods in a broad sense to refer to capital goods and services used in the 
production of final goods, see Ethier (1982) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). It is well-known that an 
increase in the number of varieties available in the economy leads to higher productivity through 
a positive externality effect. Since we focus on the introduction of new intermediate goods, we 
keep the level of employment constant.2 
(1) )1,0(;),(.)(
)(
1 ∈= ∫
∈
− ααα ditixLtY
tAi
 
Our objective is to explain the level of economic development in a dynamic setting and 
illustrate various types of welfare costs of imposing trade restrictions or other impediments to 
economic interaction with the rest of the world (RoW). To do this, we have in mind a Romer 
(1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) type endogenous growth model giving rise to an ever 
expanding variety of intermediate goods in RoW. Since the LDC economy is small, we make two 
simplifying assumptions, namely (i) the LDC economy cannot influence the economic growth 
rate in RoW (cf. Rutherford and Tarr, 2002) and (ii) the LDC economy does not engage in any 
R&D activity to develop new types of intermediate goods.  
Assumption (ii) implies that the LDC depends on R&D activity in RoW for introducing new 
types of intermediate goods, which is in accordance with the empirical results of Coe, Helpman, 
and Hoffmaister (1997) and Connolly (2003). Assumption (i), in combination with the 
                                                 
2  The notation .t  signals that the income level may depend on historical developments, see below. Some 
restrictions of our production function are discussed in section 6. Other things equal, the size of the 
economy as measured by )(tL  affects discounted profits and therefore the attractiveness of introducing 
goods on the market. As pointed out by an anonymous referee, in our setting it is in general not the growth 
rate that is affected, but the share of invented goods that is introduced.  
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assumption that RoW is on a positive balanced growth path, implies that the RoW growth rate of 
knowledge (measured by the range of invented intermediate goods )(tN ) is equal to a constant 
0>g , see (2). In general, the range of intermediate goods available on the LDC market is a 
subset of the total range of invented goods (assumed to be a measurable set), see (3). Our 
objective is to determine the size of this subset as a function of trade restrictions and the costs of 
introducing the intermediate good on the LDC market.  
(2) dtdxxwheregtNtNeNeNtN gtgt /;0)(/)(;)0()( 0 ≡>=≡= &&  
(3) [ ])(,0)( tNtA ⊆  
Given the range of available intermediate goods )(tA , the production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale in L  and ),( tix . This allows for perfect competition of final goods in the 
LDC economy, where the producers take the wage rate )(tw  and prices ),( tip  for intermediate 
goods ),( tix  as given. In equilibrium, profits by the final goods producers are zero, labor’s share 
of income will be equal to α−1 , and the share of income paid for the use of intermediate goods 
will be equal to α , see (4). Moreover, the price elasticity of demand for individual intermediate 
goods by final goods producers is equal to a constant 1>ε , see (5). 
(4) )(),(),(;)()1()(
)(
tYditixtiptYLtw
tAi
αα =−= ∫
∈
 
(5) 1)1/(1;),(),( >−≡= − αεα εε tipLtix  
To determine the range of intermediate goods actually introduced on the LDC market, we 
confront the costs and benefits of introduction for the inventor of a particular intermediate good. 
Starting with the latter, we will assume that the monopolistic producer of an intermediate good 
(who has the sole property rights to selling this good) can produce one unit of the intermediate 
good at a constant marginal cost of 1. To enable us to investigate the dynamic effects of trade 
restrictions, we will assume that the LDC government requires a payment of tariff T  for the 
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import of foreign goods.3 The foreign producers of intermediate goods take this tariff rate as 
given and assume that it will be applied indefinitely. As a result of the additively separable 
structure of the production function, the demand for a particular intermediate good if it is 
introduced on the LDC market is stable over time, see (5). Since the price elasticity of demand is 
constant, the price of intermediate goods is a constant mark-up over marginal costs and does not 
change over time, see  (6). Obviously, an increase in the tariff rate leads to a higher price charged 
for the use of intermediate goods and thus a lower quantity demanded, see (7). As a result of the 
above, instantaneous operating profits π  for the providers of intermediate goods on the LDC 
market are constant over time, see  (8). This means that the present value of operating profits of 
an intermediate good introduced on the LDC market at time t  and discounted at the interest rate 
0>ρ  is equal to the instantaneous operating profits divided by the interest rate, see  (9).4  
(6) 0/1)(';)(/)1(),( >=≡+= αα TpTpTtip  
(7) 0)1/()()(';)()1(),( 2 <+−=≡+= − TTxTxTxTLtix εα εε  
(8) εεααπ −− +−=+−≡ 112 )1()1()()1()()()( TLTxTTxTpT  
 0)1/()()1()(' <+−−= TTT πεπ  
(9) ρπτπτρ /)()()( TdTe
t
t =∫
∞
−−  
Before the owner of intermediate good i  invented at time t  can reap the benefits of 
discounted operating profits from the LDC market she has to incur fixed set-up costs ),( tic . This 
can be the cost of setting up a service and parts supply network or the costs of setting up a local 
branch consulting office, etc. We assume these set-up costs may vary for the individual producers 
of intermediate goods from a minimum of a  to a maximum of b . More specifically, we will 
                                                 
3 Equivalently, the domestic government could impose a tax on goods produced by foreign companies. 
4 Note that we assume that the interest rate is equal to the discount rate, which holds as an equilibrium 
condition with logarithmic preferences in RoW if households can borrow and lend on a frictionless credit 
market, see Grossman and Helpman (1991, pp 27-29; 1995, p. 1311). 
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assume that these costs are drawn independently from a cumulative distribution function F , 
without mass points and with support ],[ ba  (where ba <<0 ), see  (10). The decision on whether 
or not to introduce a newly invented intermediate good on the LDC market is now simple. The 
answer is yes if the discounted value of operating profits is larger than the set-up costs. 
Otherwise, the answer is no, see the indicator function ),( tiI  in  (11) and (3’). Note that the net 
profits derived from introducing a variety on the LDC market depend only on the tariff and the 
set-up cost for that particular variety. 
 (10) [ ] ,1)(,0)(,,;)(),( ===∈ bFaFbaXxxFcdfwithiidtic  
(11) 
⎩⎨
⎧ >=
otherwise
ticTif
tiI
,0
),(/)(,1
),(
ρπ
 
(3’) { }1,.)()](,0[)( =∈= iItNitA  
 
3 The range of introduced intermediate goods 
We are now able to determine the range of intermediate goods introduced on the LDC market 
relative to the range of goods in RoW as a function of the trade restrictions T . At each point in 
time, the growth rate of intermediate goods in RoW is g , implying that )(tgN  new goods 
become available for introduction on the LDC market. If the discounted value of operating profits 
ρπ /)(T  is smaller than the minimum set-up cost a , it is clear that no new intermediate goods 
will be introduced on the LDC market. Similarly, if the discounted value of operating profits is 
higher than the maximum set-up cost b , all new intermediate goods will be introduced on the 
LDC market. The more interesting case occurs, therefore, if the discounted value of operating 
profits is in between these two extremes, that is ),(]/)([ baT ∈ρπ . Since the set-up costs are 
drawn independently from the same distribution function, the law of large numbers ensures that a 
stable fraction ( β , say) of the newly invented intermediate goods will be introduced on the LDC 
market, such that )(tgNβ  new intermediate goods will be available in the LDC economy.  
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[insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 illustrates how the fraction β  of intermediate goods on the LDC market depends on 
the trade restrictions T  as a function of the operating profits π  and the discount rate ρ  for two 
distribution functions with common support, where 2F  represents a mean preserving reduction in 
the variation of the set-up costs relative to 1F .  Suppose the tariff is 0T , leading to discounted 
operating profits ρπ /)( 0T . Given enough observations, a fraction ( )ρπ /)( 0TFi  of the randomly 
drawn set-up costs will be below the discounted operating profit threshold ρπ /)( 0T . All these 
intermediate goods will be introduced on the market. Similarly, a fraction ( )ρπ /)(1 0TFi−  will be 
above the discounted operating profit threshold ρπ /)( 0T . All these intermediate goods will not 
be introduced on the market. If the trade restriction falls, say to 01 TT < , the discounted operating 
profit threshold will rise to ρπ /)( 1T  and a larger share of newly invented intermediate goods 
( )ρπ /)( 1TFi  will be available on the LDC market, see Figure 1. The figure also illustrates how a 
reduction in the variation of set-up costs leads to a more rapid increase in the share of goods on 
the LDC market for a given reduction in T  (since )()()()( 01110212 TTTT ββββ −>− ). Note, 
however, that the share itself may be either higher or lower (since )()( 1112 TT ββ >  and 
)()( 0102 TT ββ < , see section 5). For a given distribution function F , the share of intermediate 
goods introduced on the LDC market is equal to: 
(12) ( )
0'
0/'''
0'
;/)(
;/)(
;/)(0
,1
,/)(
,0
)(
=
<=
=
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∞<<
≤≤
<<
≡
β
ρπβ
β
ρπ
ρπ
ρπ
ρπβ F
Tbif
bTaif
aTif
TFT  
The crucial point is, of course, that the range of intermediate goods available on the LDC 
market depends negatively on the trade restrictions T , which allows us to investigate both 
dynamic and static welfare costs in the analysis below. An increase in the level of trade 
restrictions implies (i) a higher price charged for the use of intermediate goods, (ii) a lower 
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quantity of intermediate goods used, and (iii) lower operating profits for the producers of 
intermediate goods. For trade restrictions in between two critical values determined by the 
minimum and maximum set-up costs (the support limits a  and b  of the distribution function), 
the lower operating profits will lead to a strict fall in the share of goods introduced on the LDC 
market. For ease of reference we will call these critical values upperT  and lowerT , defined as: 
 0)(;)(1 =⇒≥≡ − TTTaT upperupper βρπ  
 
1)(0;
1/)0(
,)(
,0
1 =⇒≤≤
<
⎩⎨
⎧= − TTTotherwise
if
b
T
lower
lower β
ρπ
ρπ  
 
4 Balanced growth and welfare 
This section focuses on LDC welfare under the assumption that the same trade policy has been 
operative indefinitely. We therefore assume that the same fraction of intermediate goods as 
dictated by the function )(Tβ  of (12) has also been introduced at time 0 . The next section 
analyzes transitory dynamics if government policy is changed. Under the simplifying assumption 
above, the share of intermediate goods on the LDC market is constant over time; i.e. if (.)M  is 
the measure of firms, it follows that: 
(13) gtNtNtAMtAMTtNTtAM ==⇒>= )(/)())((/))((0)(;)()())(( &&ββ  
The growth rate of available intermediate goods in the LDC economy is therefore equal to the 
growth rate g  in RoW for all time periods. This allows us to determine the level of output and 
government revenue as a function of the level of trade restrictions, see Appendix I. Since the use 
of intermediate goods x  is a declining function of T  and the share of intermediate goods 
available on the LDC market is a non-increasing function of T , the output level is a decreasing 
function of the level of trade restrictions.5 Instantaneous welfare W  for the LDC is the sum of 
                                                 
5 There is a strictly positive level of trade restrictions, ),0(max upperG TT ∈−  say, which maximizes the 
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government revenue and labor income. As explained in Appendix I and summarized in 
Proposition I, it is a strictly declining function of the level of trade restrictions: 0)(' <TW . Since 
total welfare is just the discounted value of instantaneous welfare, the optimal LDC policy is to 
impose no trade restrictions at all, leading to total welfare )/()0( gW −ρ . In this section, which 
ignores transition dynamics, the increase in available varieties (equal to the growth rate of the 
economy) is dictated by progress in RoW (equal to g ). The next section demonstrates not only 
that the LDC economy evolves over time to the balanced growth path, but also that the change in 
the LDC growth rate and the level of income can be substantial if we allow for changes in 
government policy and incorporate transition dynamics.  
 
Proposition I. The LDC balanced growth path is given in (A1)-(A3). Income, welfare, and the 
share of introduced intermediate goods all increase if the level of trade restrictions falls. 
 
5 Policy changes and transition dynamics 
A crucial aspect of our model is the sunk cost nature of the set-up costs. This implies that once a 
good has been introduced on the LDC market it will continue to be supplied independently of 
subsequent changes in the level of trade restrictions. The income level is therefore path-dependent 
(hysteresis) and the economic response to changes in government policy is asymmetric, see van 
Marrewijk and Berden (2004) for further details on this section. 
Policy change experiment. Suppose the government of the developing country imposes a 
tariff level 0T  from time 0 to time 1t . We assume that (i) within this time frame it is expected that 
this tariff level will be maintained indefinitely, (ii) a positive fraction of newly invented goods is 
introduced on the LDC market ( upperTT <≤ 00 ), and (iii) the LDC economy is initially on a 
balanced growth path ( 000 )())0(( MNTAM ≡= β ). At time 1t , as the measure of active firms is 
                                                                                                                                                 
present discounted value of government revenue. Myopic government revenue maximization (given the 
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11))(( MtAM ≡ , the LDC government unexpectedly changes its policy to a tariff level 1T . We 
furthermore assume that (iv) the LDC government henceforth maintains 1T  indefinitely, which (v) 
is immediately expected from time 1t  onwards. The notation 
+
1t  indicates a rise in the level of 
trade restrictions ( 01 TT > ) and the notation −1t  indicates a fall ( 01 TT < ). 
An increase in trade restrictions. We distinguish between two groups of intermediate goods 
producers, which together give rise to the measure of active firms given in (14).  
 The first group consists of all intermediate goods producers who entered the LDC market 
before the policy change at time period 1t . Since the set-up costs are sunk costs, they will remain 
active despite the policy change. Consequently, some of these producers will ex post conclude 
that they have made the wrong decision as the discounted value of operating profits turns out to 
be lower than the set-up costs.  
 The second group consists of all intermediate goods producers who may enter the LDC 
market after the policy change at time period 1t . They know their instantaneous profits are )( 1Tπ  
and will enter the market if the discounted profits are higher than the set-up costs. A fraction 
)( 1Tβ  will enter the market from time period 1t  onwards, see (14). Income and government 
revenue are given in Appendix II, as summarized in Proposition II. 
(14) [ ] ),[
),0[
,)()()(
,
))((
1
1
01001
0
1 1 ∞∈
∈
⎩⎨
⎧
−+=
+
ttif
ttif
NeTTNeT
eMttAM gtgt
gt
βββ   
 
Proposition II. After an increase in the level of trade restrictions in accordance with the policy 
change experiment, the economy adjusts over time to a new balanced growth path. The transition 
dynamics are given in equations (14), (A4), and (A5).  
 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                 
measure of active firms) leads to )1/(1 −ε=myopicT , larger than max−GT  due to the term ββ /'  in (A2). 
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Static and dynamic costs of an increase in trade restrictions. The main economic implications 
for the LDC are illustrated in Figure 2. At the time of the policy change there is an immediate 
reduction in the income level (indicated by the arrow in the figure), not because the number of 
intermediate goods available on the LDC market changes instantaneously, but because the higher 
price reduces demand and the income level. We label this the static costs of increasing trade 
restrictions and measure it as the percentage reduction in income at time 1t . (This is the same as 
calculating the fall in discounted income under the assumption that the measure of active firms 
grows at the constant rate g  after the policy change.) Note that, at time 1t  of the policy change, 
our static costs are equal to Romer’s (1994, p. 33) unexpected/unanticipated costs of trade 
restrictions. After the policy change, the LDC economy adjusts over time to a new asymptotic 
balanced growth path dictated by the new level of trade restrictions 1T . The economic growth rate 
falls at 1t  and increases gradually thereafter until the old growth rate g  is reached 
asymptotically. We measure the dynamic costs of an increase in trade restrictions as the 
percentage reduction in the discounted value of income relative to its value without the policy 
change. These costs are not the same as Romer’s (1994, p. 34) expected/anticipated costs of trade 
restrictions, which at the time of the policy change 1t  would indicate by how much income falls 
relative to policy 0T  if the policy change to 1T  had been fully anticipated, which is equal to the 
difference in balanced growth paths at time 1t , see Figure 2. Note that we assumed that the policy 
change was unexpected at time 1t , giving us the following relationships between the costs:
6  
(15) costsexpectedsRomer'costsdynamiccostsunexpectedsRomer'costsstatic ≤≤=  
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
                                                 
6 Also note that if the policy change was already anticipated t  periods prior to its implementation (‘partial 
anticipation’), there would be an adjustment path of the economy starting at tt −1  with associated higher 
‘partially-anticipated dynamic costs’. The dynamic costs discussed in the paper and illustrated in Figure 3 
provide the lower bound for such ‘partially-anticipated dynamic costs’, while Romer’s expected costs 
provide the upper bound. Both are therefore useful benchmarks for the likely true range of dynamic costs.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the static, dynamic, and Romer’s expected costs in terms of welfare loss, 
starting from free trade ( 00 =T ) and depicted in a compact space (for Te−−1 , which ranges from 
0  to 1 as T  increases).7 Most importantly, we note that the dynamic costs are in general 
substantially larger than the static costs. A tariff level of 10% leads to an 8% fall in static welfare 
and a substantially larger 25% fall in dynamic welfare. Romer’s fully anticipated expected 
welfare costs are as high as 50%. An increase of the tariff level to 20% leads to a static welfare 
loss of 17%, a dynamic welfare loss of 45%, and a Romer expected cost of 88%.  
Reducing trade restrictions: asymmetry in adjustment. The results discussed above on the 
effects of an increase in trade restrictions would hold in reverse for a decrease in trade 
restrictions, that is lead to an increase in income and welfare gains mimicking the discussion 
above, if we assume that intermediate goods producers can only enter the LDC market at the 
moment the new intermediate good is invented. This, however, is a too restrictive assumption. 
The crucial difference between an increase and a decrease in the level of trade restrictions is that 
intermediate goods producers will not exit the LDC market once they entered it if restrictions 
increase (as operating profits are always positive), but may decide to enter the LDC market if they 
earlier opted not to do so if restrictions decrease. This asymmetry has implications for the 
adjustment path of the economy, as the LDC economy immediately jumps to a new balanced 
growth path if trade restrictions are decreased, see (14’), Appendix II, and Proposition III. 
(14’) 
),[
),0[
,)(
,)(
))((
1
1
01
00
1 ∞∈
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⎧=−
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eNT
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Proposition III. After a decrease in the level of trade restrictions in accordance with the policy 
change experiment, the economy immediately jumps to a new balanced growth path, as 
summarized by equations (14’), (A4’), and (A5’).  
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix I for the difference between income costs and welfare costs.  
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6 Discussion 
We extended Romer’s (1994) argument on the importance of endogenously determining the 
number of varieties available on the LDC market for a proper understanding of the potentially 
devastating consequences of imposing trade restrictions, to a simple dynamic setting which 
allowed us to derive balanced growth paths and explicit transition dynamics. The (short-run) 
static costs of trade restrictions take the number of varieties as given, whereas the (long-run) 
dynamic costs take the endogenous determination of future acces to succesful R&D projects 
undertaken elsewhere into due consideration. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and in Table 1 for 
some alternative parameter settings, the dynamic costs of trade restrictions can be substantial in 
our model even for tariff rates of 10-20% and are generally much larger than the static costs of 
trade restrictions. Table 1 also illustrates that the static costs do not vary with the rate of time 
preference, the rate of innovation, and the minimum or maximum set-up costs, whereas the 
dynamic costs increase if the set-up costs rise (implying that a smaller range of varieties is 
introduced on the LDC market) or if the rate of innovation rises. As usual in this kind of setting, 
the impact of an increase in the rate of time preference is ambivalent as the higher long-run future 
welfare loss may be offset by the higher preference for consuming today. The most important 
parameters for determining the dynamic costs are the rate of innovation g  and the parameter α . 
Interpreting changes in the latter is complicated, however, in view of its dual role in our model.8  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
In modeling the intermediate goods market while making sure that not all firms are active on 
the LDC market we have two options.9 First, intermediate goods can be homogenous, in which 
case the number of active firms must negatively affect profits of each firm to ensure that entry 
                                                 
8 See below and Appendix III. Also note that for 6.0=α  and 10.01 =T  there is no deviation between the 
static and dynamic welfare costs in Table 1. Indeed, if lowerTT <1  all intermediate goods are available on 
the LDC market. This theoretical possibility is probably of little practical importance, since usually only a 
(small) fraction of all intermediate varieties is available on the LDC market and an increase in trade 
restrictions immediately leads to a deviation between static and dynamic welfare costs. 
On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions 
© van Marrewijk and Berden, 2006 14
decreases profitability among importers of intermediate goods. The problem is that, once the 
imported quantity is sufficiently high, profits fall to zero and there is no growth in imports. 
Second, intermediate goods can be heterogeneous and parameters are chosen such that variety has 
no direct effect on the profitability of importing intermediate goods. This is the case if the 
elasticity of substitution is equal to the inverse of the share of labor ( )1/(1 αε −= , see Appendix 
III). The disadvantage of this approach is that the parameter α  serves two roles, namely as the 
cost share of intermediate goods and as a parameter determining the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties. The advantage of this approach is that variety does not affect the profitability 
of individual importers, which yields the nice result that net profits derived from introducing a 
variety on the LDC market depend only on the tariff and the set-up cost for that particular variety. 
Within the heterogeneous goods approach there are, finally, two more options: (i) heterogeneity 
can be at the level of the cost of introducing goods to new markets, or (ii) goods may be 
heterogeneous in quality, cost, or demand. We analyze option (i) in this paper, but as shown by 
Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) the welfare effects tend to be larger under option (i) than 
under option (ii) because of the larger Dupuit triangles at the (extensive) margin. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Our model predicts an asymmetric adjustment process, with a potentially more rapid increase 
in GDP growth after a decrease in trade restrictions than the decrease in GDP growth after an 
increase in trade restrictions. To test this implication of the model we combined Sachs and 
Warner’s (1995) trade openness indicators with the Maddison (2003) per capita GDP data. Sachs 
and Warner classify a country as closed or open based on tariff rates, non tariff barriers, a black 
market exchange rate, a state monopoly on major exports, and a socialist economic system. The 
emphasis in this work is on trade liberalization, as it is in Wacziarg and Welch’s (2003) update, 
who conclude (p. 3): “the effects of increased policy openness within countries through time are positive, 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing the structure and arguments of this paragraph. 
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economically large, and statistically significant.” Using a similar, within-country-through-time 
analysis, we are equally interested in the opposite movement from an open to a closed trading 
system. Maddison (2003) provides GDP per capita data (measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars) for the period 1950-2001. We analyze the time trend of )/ln( capGDP  for the 
year of the policy change and the 10 years before and after the policy change separately for all 
developing countries going through a regime change as indicated by Sachs and Warner for which 
these data are available, see Table 2. There are 15 developing countries going from an open to a 
closed trade regime. The average decrease in the time trend of the rate of growth was 0.3 per cent 
per year. There are 32 developing countries going from a closed to an open trade regime. The 
average increase in the time trend of the rate of growth was 1.79 per cent per year. This increase 
is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, as is the difference between the decrease 
following a rise in trade restrictions and the increase following a decline in trade restrictions, thus 
providing support for an asymmetric adjustment process. 
In line with our theoretical approach, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that Costa 
Rica’s 1986 – 1991 trade liberalization was accompanied by a surge in import variety, where a 
one percent larger market is associated with about 0.2 percent more varieties and a 1 percent 
lower tariff with an increase in variety of about 0.5 percent. Similarly, Haveman, Nair-Reichert, 
and Thursby (2003) analyze the effect of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on international 
trade flows and argue that higher multilateral tariffs tend to shift trade towards larger exporters, 
which indicates that the desire to minimize on the fixed (set-up) costs of trade flows is 
empirically important. In our approach the benefits of trade are reflected in increases in total 
factor productivity. Pavcnik (2002) analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on plant productivity 
in the case of Chile. Her estimates suggest the existence of increasing returns to scale in all 
sectors and show that productivity of plants in the import-competing sectors grew 3 to 10 percent 
more than in the non-traded goods sectors. In line with our asymmetry argument she also notes 
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the importance of commitment and expectations by arguing that (p. 264): 10 “plants might not 
instantaneously react to an implementation in a change in trade policy. ..[but only].. after they were 
convinced of the government’s lasting commitment.”  
 
7 Conclusion 
We analyze the static and dynamic costs of a change in trade restrictions for a small developing 
economy (LDC) which combines labor and intermediate goods in its final goods production 
process. The LDC economy depends on successful R&D projects undertaken elsewhere (RoW) 
and introduced on the LDC market for an increase in the range of available intermediate goods. A 
new intermediate good is only introduced on the LDC market if the (expected) discounted value 
of operating profits is larger than the set-up costs. Since operating profits decline as the level of 
trade restrictions rises, the share of intermediate goods introduced on the LDC market also 
declines as the level of trade restrictions rises. 
The developing economy evolves over time to a balanced growth path. As a result of the 
sunk-cost nature of the set-up costs, there is an asymmetric adjustment path for the LDC economy 
after a change in trade restrictions. An increase in the level of trade restrictions will slow-down 
economic growth and put the LDC economy on a transition path to the new balanced growth rate. 
If the new level of trade restrictions exceeds a critical value, the new growth rate will be zero and 
stagnation occurs. During this process the dynamic costs of a rise in trade restrictions are 
generally much larger than the static costs as a result of the fall in the share of new goods 
introduced on the LDC market. If trade restrictions fall, on the other hand, the LDC economy may 
embark on a rapid catch-up process of economic growth by benefiting from the backlog of 
previously-invented-but-not-yet-introduced intermediate goods which may now, as a result of the 
increase in operating profits, be introduced on the LDC market. This is also discussed, for 
example, in Romer (2007), who notes: “After independence, India’s commitment to closing itself off and 
                                                 
10 Van Marrewijk and Berden (2004) provide a brief discussion of expectations in this model. 
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striving for self-sufficiency was as strong as Taiwan’s commitment to acquiring foreign ideas and 
participating fully in world markets. The outcomes – grinding poverty in India and opulence in Taiwan – could 
hardly be more disparate.” In general, our model predicts that a decline in prosperity following 
increases in trade restrictions is more gradual than the possible increases in prosperity following 
reductions in trade restrictions. We provide some empirical support for this implication.  
 
Appendix 
 I. Balanced growth. Using (7), (12), and (13) gives (A1). Government revenue G  is given in 
(A2). Instantaneous welfare W  for the small developing economy is the sum of government 
revenue and labor income, see (A3), where the first inequality follows from ignoring some 
negative terms, after which we use sequentially 1)1( =− εα , the fact that 0Nβ  is equal to the 
measure of active firms at time 0 together with the second part of  (4), (6), and (7), and again the 
optimal pricing rule (6).  
(A1) gtgt eTYeNTTxLTxtAMLTtY )()()()())(()( 0
11 ≡== −− βαααα  
 [ ] 0)()1/()/'()(' <+−= TYTTY αεββ  
(A2)  gtgt eTGeNTxTTTxTtAMTtG )()()()())(()( 0 ≡== β   
 [ ] 0)0(';0)()0(;)()1/()/'()(' 0 >==+−+= GTGGTGTNxTG upperεβββ  
(A3) [ ] gtgt eTWeTYTGTtYTtGTtW )()()1()()()1()()( ≡−+=−+= αα  
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 II. Policy change dynamics. Using (14) for an increase in trade restrictions gives: 
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Similarly, using (14’) for a decrease in trade restrictions, we get: 
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 III. Elasticity of substitution and share of intermediate goods.11 Suppose the production 
function is given by (A6), where α  is the cost share of intermediate goods and γ  determines the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties (equal to )1/(1 γε −≡ ). The demand for an individual 
variety is then governed by (A7). If xix =)(  for all i , then xnX γ/1= . With x  fixed, then )(ix  is 
independent of n  if and only if γα = . 
(A6) )1,0(,;)(;
/1
0
1 ∈⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛== ∫− γα
γ
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(A7) 1)1( )(
)(
−−−= γγααα ixXL
idx
dY  
                                                 
11 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for simplifying this appendix. 
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 Figure 1 Distribution function F  and share of introduced goods β  
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The illustrated cdf is a beta distribution with support [2,10] and parameters equal to 2 (curve labelled ‘F1’) 
and equal to 5 (curve labelled ‘F2’), a mean preserving reduction in the variation of the set-up costs. 
 
Figure 2 Dynamic effects of an increase in trade restrictions 
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Parameter values: 6.0;5.0;10;02.0;05.0;60;8.0 101 =====ρ==α TTtgL , combined with a beta 
distribution function with support [2,10] and parameters equal to 2.  
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Figure 3 Welfare costs of an increase in trade restrictions: an example 
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Parameter values: 0;02.0;05.0;15;7.0 0 ===== TgL ρα ; beta cdf, parameters 4, support [5,14]. 
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Table 1 Welfare costs of increase in trade restrictions (per cent reduction in welfare) 
Initial tariff: 10.00 =T  10.01 =T  20.0'1 =T  
 welfare costs welfare costs 
   Romer   Romer 
 static dynamic expected static dynamic expected 
default setting 8.1 24.9 50.3 16.9 45.2 87.7 
Share of intermediate goods and elasticity parameter α ; default 7.0=α  
6.0=α  6.2 6.2 6.3 12.5 14.7 18.0 
8.0=α  11.8 47.0 99.9 26.1 55.6 100 
Rate of time preference; default 05.0=ρ  
04.0=ρ  8.1 10.5 12.9 16.9 35.2 53.6 
06.0=ρ  8.1 30.3 74.8 16.9 43.8 97.6 
Rate of innovation; default 02.0=g  
01.0=g  8.1 16.5 50.3 16.9 31.0 87.7 
03.0=g  8.1 33.4 50.3 16.9 59.4 87.7 
Minimum set-up costs; default 5=a  
4=a  8.1 21.2 40.9 16.9 41.4 78.3 
6=a  8.1 29.7 62.3 16.9 48.3 95.6 
Maximum set-up costs; default 14=b  
13=b  8.1 20.8 40.0 16.9 43.5 83.4 
15=b  8.1 27.7 57.2 16.9 46.2 90.3 
Default parameters: see Figure 3 
 
On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions 
© van Marrewijk and Berden, 2006 24
 
Table 2 Asymmetric trade policy adjustment; time trend of ln(income per capita), 1950-2001 
 from open to closed* from closed to open** 
Number of observations 15 32 
Average time trend 10 years before policy 
change plus year of policy change 
0.0191 0.0053 
Average time trend 10 years after policy 
change plus year of policy change 
0.0162 0.0233 
Average change in time trend -.0030 0.0179 
standard error of change in time trend 0.0076 0.0036 
* Sri Lanka (1957), Venezuela (1960), El Salvador (1961), Nicaragua (1961), Costa Rica (1962), 
Guatemala (1962), Honduras (1962), Morocco (1965), Syria (1966), Kenya (1968), Peru (1968), Jamaica 
(1974), Bolivia (1979), Ecuador (1984), Sri Lanka (1984) 
** Japan (1962), Taiwan (1964), South Korea (1969), Indonesia (1971), Chile (1976), Sri Lanka (1978), 
Botswana (1979), Morocco (1985), Bolivia (1986), Columbia (1986), Gambia (1986), Ghana (1986), Costa 
Rica (1987), Guinea (1987), Guinea-Bissau (1987), Mexico (1987), Uganda (1988), Guatemala (1989), 
Philippines (1989), Tunisia (1989), Benin (1990), El Salvador (1990), Jamaica (1990), Paraguay (1990), 
Turkey (1990), Venezuela (1990), Argentina (1991), Brazil (1991), Hungary (1991), Mali (1991), Poland 
(1991), and Uruguay (1991).  
Source: calculations based on Sachs and Warner (1995) and Maddison (2003). 
 
